



SECRET



16 March 1979

DD/A Registry

File *Meeter*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of Defense,
15 March 1979 (U)

3. He mentioned that he had a memo from Bobby Inman complaining about a very bad leak [redacted]

[redacted] He was having his General Counsel try to look into this primarily because the laws with respect to communications security are better than with respect to intelligence in general.

The Secretary indicated he felt that the number of leaks we had on intelligence matters today indicated that the Intelligence Community as a whole was more prone to leaks than any other element of the government. He wasn't pointing a finger at any particular element of the Community, but rather that the number of leaks of intelligence matters is unusually high.

I think we ought to consider an analysis of the leaks in intelligence to see if we can indicate any kind of a pattern. I don't know whether this can profitably be done or not, but I would like to consider it. If Harold Brown is at all right that the Community is prone to leaks, this is certainly something we should be paying attention to. (S)

(over)

79-0945

6. I discussed some of the organizational problems we were having at the moment. I said in general that I thought the relationship was deteriorating and that people were reopening the Executive Order in some instances. I pointed to the particular problem I had had in putting poor Bobby Inman in the middle with respect to [] I didn't know that this was the case but I had the impression that he had been given instructions that [] wasn't my business, and therefore he was having trouble because I was asking for information about [] and wanting to play a part in it. I explained why I thought I had a legitimate part in it.

I said that we had had endless problems which were more attitudinal than factual on getting agreement for space in the Pentagon. I said I would take this up with Charles Duncan in the specifics when he returned. My problem was less, however, the actual square footage, etc., than it was the fact that at every turn we were being nibbled away at here and there. The Secretary said that was not right because it was they who wanted us in the Pentagon. I said there was no indication from the working level that anybody was interested in having us.

I said maybe I had caused some of the problems by pushing so hard on the DIA building. It now seemed to me that we should give up on that one. He indicated he saw no possibility of a solution for the money end of it. If the money could be had, he didn't want to give up the possibility that they'd be better located close to the CIA analysts.

I then mentioned the Defense Intelligence School issue and that I understood the present thinking in DIA was to put it in some Air Force base rather than at an installation with an academic faculty. (S)

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	EO/DDA	3/19	<i>[Signature]</i>
2			
3	A/DDA FYI	3/20	<i>[Signature]</i>
4			
5	DDA	21 MAR 1973	<i>[Signature]</i>
6	<i>Reg - Sub ec</i>		

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM		X	(less para 5)	
4	DD/NFA		X		
5	DD/CT		X	(less para 5)	
6	DD/A		X	(paras 3 & 6 extracted)	
7	DD/O		X	(less para 5)	
8	DD/S&T		X		
9	GC		X	(para 3 extracted)	
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18		X			
19	D/Sec	X			
20	ES		X	(para 3 extracted)	
21					
22					

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

Executive Secretary